The gene ral equilibrium model was fi r st formulated by Walras (29) , whose law says that if one market at a Walrasian p r ice vector shows excess dema nd (supp ly) , then at least one of the othe r markets must exhibit excess supply (demand) : in othe r wo rds , the summation of the value of the excess demands equals zero . Along with this concept , gene ral equilibrium for a competitive economy can be defined as a p r ice vector, the elements of which are the prices of outputs and inputs , such that all markets clea r at once . The gene r al equilibrium theory , by utilizing Walras ' law and the Pareto optimality , takes account of the interaction of the economic agents through markets (4) .
Wald (28) 1) it is so based o n the l oc al analys is that it is not wellsuite d for the analysi s of t l-te h i gher r ate tax (e.g ., 5"1%) distortion.
2) aggregatin g the sectors o r factors into two i s t oo severe. 3) it i s not re a li s tic to assume the fixe r' ! fa c t o r endowments , and 4) analyzing one di stortio n at a time can be mi sleading .
A compute r al go rithm fo r calcula tin g ge ner a l equil i b rium prices originally developed by Sca r f [ 17 , 181 has been a very Shoven and Whalley's works [20 , 24) , based on Scarf 's algorithm , demonstrated a proof of the existence of a competitive equilibrium for an economy with producer and consumer commodity taxes, and developed a computational procedure for the determination of the equilibrium with the taxes being considered. In their model, the government is assumed to be a tax collecting and revenue dispersing agency.
Although Scarf , Shoven, Whalley, and othe rs calculated general equilibrium prices with and without taxes by using the Scarf -type algorithm and by turning the abstract economy into a more realisti c one , thei r method so far did not have full rationality for usefulness in actual economies because they conducted the demonstration in terms of primitive sets as seen at the next section.
This complaint, however, became much less valid after
Merrill refined the Scarf ' s algorithm . The Merrill's fixed point algorithm solves the simultaneous highly-nonlinear equations, finding a general equil i brium price vector.
Shoven and Whalley [23] , using the Merrill's algorithm with the Arrow and Hahn's model [2] , employed the two secto rtwo factor-two consumer model to compute general equilibrium market demand equals market supply fo r all inputs and outputs and profits are zero in each industry.
These cond i tions produce six equations reduced t o fou r with four unknowns. The equilibrium price vector of these simultaneous equations are solved by the Merrill ' s algorithm if the parameters of production and consumption functions were specified and the exogenous variables known. Tt is o ut of a question to compute a general equilibrium price vecto r with one tax o r more taxes if we ad rl one more cond ition that the transfer payments to consume rs equal the tax revenue collected by the governmen t, which i s consi rle red as a consumer .
Policy app r aisal determining if a particular policy change is welfare-improving usually relies upon a comparjso n be twee n a no-tax equilibrium and a tax equ ilibrium. Numerical measu res of the gain or loss widely emp l oyen a re Hicksian com pensating (CV) and equivalent (EV) variations associated with the equilibrium compa ri son . W elfare cos ts oE tAxes for the economy as a whole are measured by aggregati n g t he cvs or Evs across individuals [9] .
In the review of previous works , I commodity , Xi is the market demand for the commodity i , and Wi is the total initial endowments of the commodity i . x · is a 1 sum of individual ' s demand functions (L:xij) , each of which is derived from maximizing the individual ' s utility function subject to the budget constraint , while Wi= L:wij ' where wij is the initial endowment of the i-th commodity to individual j. P r oduction is described by an arbitrary activity analysis matrix labelled "An* m" (m>n) . Each column of the A matrix refers to a feasible activity , the first n columns (negative n*n identity matrix) indicating free disposibility. An a· · l]
(an element of the A matrix) is positive for an output an0 negative for an input .
A competitive equ i lib rium i s defined by a price vect o r, p* , and a vector o f activity levels, y* , such that 1. demand equals supply in each market * * .
2 . p r ofit is no better than the break even l:Piaij<=0 for all j, with equality if Yj*>0
To find a p* and associated y* which approximately meet the above two conditions , the Bn*k matrix (n<k<=m) is c reated from the A matrix by the specific rul es so as to satisfy the t heo rem : there exist s a primitive set , pjl, pjn, so that the columns , jl , •• • , jn , form a feasible basis for By=W.
Such primitive set , which is an n*n price matrix , approximates a competitive equilibrium price . The usefulness of the algorithm i s du e t o the fact that it allows a computer t o rapidly find a p r imitive set whic h app r oximates a compet itive equ ilibrium rapidly.
Shoven and Whalley (2~, 22 , 24] and Shoven r21] added a tax system to the Scarf ' s algor it hm to compute an equilibrium price with prod ucer and/or consumer commodity taxes . All government revenue is dist r ibuted to consumers as tran sfe r payments , which affect a co nsumer's budget constraint.
The market demand functions , which depend on the n commodity prices (P 1 , ••• , Pn) and the tax r 2v enue (R) ,
One cha nge to the Scarf 's A matrix is to ad d one mo r e r o w.
Thus, the last row of each co lumn of the A matrix becomes the tax revenue (rj) from the corresponding column , where r j = l::Pitijaij (tij is the ad valorem tax rates) . An equilibrium . * price vect o r , P =(P 1 , •.
• , Pn , R) , and nonnegative activity * levels , y , sat isf y the two equilibrium conditions : 1) supply is equal t o demand for each commodity, and 2) aft e r-tax profit is maximized at the price vector , p*. At the above two conditions with the Walras ' law , it was shown that the revenu e distributed among consumers was same as that generated on the production and/or consumption s i de .
Shoven and Whalley not only showed the proof of the existence of an equilibrium p ri ce with the p r oducer and /or consume r taxes by modifying the Scarf ' s algorithm , but also c al c ul ated the efficiency loss and the incidence effects of a d iff e re ntial taxati on by comparing the equilibria in both the p r ese nce a n d t he absence of the su r tax. He disaggregated the dema nd side into l~ consume r groups, the government , and the foreign sector; the production side into 14 industries , and assumed the r e were Cobb -Douglas u t ility and production functions . He concluded that the pol i cy change caused resource allocation to move in favor of the go v e rnm en t t a r get secto r s , s uch as a g ri c ul t ur e a nd food s t uffs , and the income distribution " imp r oved ," reducing di f ferentials between urban and rural households .
As seen from the previous works , some of the advantages o f t h e AGEA a r e as follows :
1 . no l ocaliz ation assumptions are r equire0 .
2.
it is simple to incorporate many commodities an d
cl asses of consumers .
. the effect of seve r al simultane o us distortions
can be analyzed by using the empirical data .
IIT . OBJECTIVES
The Scarf -type computer algorithm has p r ovided an excellent t ool to solve the highly no nlinear equations yielded by ge ne r a l equilibrium analysis. By using it , the AGEA went beyond traditional two -sector general equilib r ium models , thereby allowing for much mo re detail and complexity .
My major objective in this paper is t o empl oy AGEA to compute gene r al equilibrium pr ices wit h and without a tax for the hypothetical two -sector, three-consumer model . I modify the Shaven and Whal ley' s example [ 23] to al low labor -leisure choices . Also , I compare pre-, and post-tax equilibria to see who ga ins , o r loses f rom the tax programs being considered .
The Hicksian compensating (CV) and equivalent (EV) variations are also computed to facilitate this comparison.
IV . THE MODELS AND RESULTS

A. Assumptions
Taking some assumptions from traditional microeconomic theories in this paper, I employ the Arrow and Hahn ' s model [2] , which is commonly used for the AGEA.
The number of consumers is specified . In competitive equi li brium , a price vecto r and level of production in each industry satisfy the following conditions :
1 . market demand equals supply in inputs.
2 . mark et demand equals supply in outputs . Si nce the CES function is quasi -concave , the demand function for the input and output has the cha r acteristics cited i n the previous section.
The production functions are given by 
~~)
(1-ci)
Meanwhile, the t o tal cos t functions of each secto r become Ki Pk ( n)
Li PW Plugging (2) and (4) into (11) gives
The above cost functions (7) 
Si n ce MC of an industry sh o wing CRS is always equal to the p rice o f its o utput fo r positive production , the pr o fit is zer o . Thu s , the equati o n (8) i s equivalent t o the zero p r ofi t c ondition.
The CES utility functions are given by where Dj = aljPl(l -sj) + a2jP2(1-sj) + a3jPw(l-sj ) and
In this model , there a r e fifteen parameters whose values need to be specified : six p r oduction function parameters affecting the supply of two products (ai , bi , and ci for i=l , 2) and nine utility function parameters which dete r mine the demand for each of two p r od ucts by each of three consumers (alj , a2j , and sj for j=l , 2 , 3) . There are three exogenous var iable s whose values must also be specified : the endowments of cap it a l (Wkl , Wk2 , and Wk3).
The solut i on t o this model is characterized by 17
variables , the four prices , Pl , P2 , Pw , and Pk , nine demand qu antities, Xll , X21 , Rl , Xl2 , X22 , R2 , Xl3 , X/.3 , and Rl , two labor inputs , Ll and L2 , and two capital intensities , kl and k2 .
The equilibrium conditions in this model are facto r ma rke t clea r ing, output ma rket clearing , and zero profits:
1 . factor market c l ea ring (17) Ll + L2 = 72 -Rl -R2 -R3 (18) klLl + k 2 L2 = k (k is t he t otal market endowment) , wh e re Ll , L2 , kl, and k2 are g iven by (3) and ( 4) , 2 . o utput ma r ket clearing (19) Xll + Xl 2 + Xl3 = Ql (2 0) X21 + X22 + X23 = Q2 , whe r e Xlj an d X2j a re giv en by (14) and (15) , and Qi are give n by (1) ,
where the se equations are from (8) .
On ce t he parameters of t hese production and demand functions are specif ied and the cap i tal endowme nts are known , a so lution to sa ti sfy the s imultaneous highly -nonlinea r equatio ns (17) - ( 22) above is ob tained .
Putting nume ri cal values fo r al l the parameters and the exoge n o us va ria bles in Table 1 below , I solved the equations using a compute r package n ame d TK! So lver .
2"
What I have to note in this specification is that the curvature of the isoquant of the sector 1 is more rapid than 
20
The Poor The equilib rium solutio n with the labor price as numeraire is shown in Table ? . . As see n from Table ? . , at the equilibrium p ri ces , total demand for each output exactly matches the amount produced , and producer revenues equal consumer expenditures . Labo r supplied by the labor-leisure choice and capital endowments are fully employed , and consumer factor incomes equal producer factor costs . Because of the 
assumption of CRS in production , the per -unit cost in each industry equals the selling price , meaning that economic profits are zero . Utility is the numerical value of the utility function (9) , whic h is same as that of indirect utility, which will play an important role when calculating cvs and EVs . Since only relative prices affect behavior in general equilibrium models, I have chosen labor as numeraire .
c . Gene ral Equilibrium with Taxes and Results
The interdependence of demands and supplies , and tax revenu es should be considered when taxes are being inco r porated into this model. For a given tax program (that is, for a specified tax rate imposed on a pa rticular ou tput o r facto r ) , tax revenu es will be determined onc e demands, production levels , and factor employments are known . Also , demands depends on tax proceeds since these are redistributed to consumers , shifting individual budget const raints. The solution, thus , will be not on ly for equilibri um prices , but also for equilibrium tax revenues. In this model with taxes, I assume all go vernment rev e nues are redistributed to consumers : tax revenues collected by government equal the transfer payments to consumers , shares of which sum to unity. Table 1 . The full ar ra ys of the equations are shown in Appendix (of course, they are same as the no -tax equilibrium equations when the tax rates are all zero) .
The tax programs considered are (tax rates are arbitrarily chosen) :
1.
.
3 .
tax program 1;
only .
tax program 2; secto r s .
tax program 3;
both sectors .
50% tax on capita l income in sector 1 50% tax on capital income in both 50% tax on all factor income in
The new equilibrium solutions corresponding to the above schemes are shown in Tables 3 , 4 , a nd ~. I will compa re each of the solutions with the no-tax equilibrium in Table 2 .
From Table 3 , which shows the re sults of the tax program 1, we see that the 50% tax on capital income in sector 1 causes the net-of-tax return on capita l to fall . Capi tal employment in sector 1 falls , while that in secto r 2 rises.
Because this tax is avoidable through factor mob ility, capital intensity in sector 1 naturally fal ls while that of sector ?.
rises because of the decli ne in the ne t rental rate on capital . Less manufactu ring, and more nonmanufacturing ou tput, is produced be ca use of the tax . price of the ma nufacturing output, therefore, increases, and that of nonmanufacturing o ne decreases . The incomes of the poor increase wh i le the o th er two consumers' incomes decrease even 2S 
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though the labor supply of the poo r falls , while t hat of the rich and middle rises , increasing the t o tal labor supply. The util ity of the rich falls wh i l e that of t he middle and poor rises. Details about welfare changes will be discussed in the next section.
The equilibrium solution f o r t he t ax prog ra m 2 is sh o wn in Table 4 . Since the 50% tax is levied on cap ital income in both sectors, t his tax can no t be avoided t h r o ug h shifting capital between secto r s . Naturally , the n et-o f -tax p rice of capital falls , though the gr oss cos t o f capital to firms is essentially unch anged (it inc reas es from 0 . 3rt4 to 0 . 30') , measured in labo r units). Over a ll, the t ax -since it is o n a Table 5 shows the results of the tax program 3 , the 511% tax on labor and capital income in both sectors . The tax on cap i tal, which is unavoidable , affects r esource allocation only through its impact on the income distribution; however, the tax on labor income could be av o ided by reducing the supply of labor hours . As we see from Table 5 The CV is defined as the amount of in come we can take away from , or give to , an individual after an economic c hange , while leaving him as well off as he was before it . The EV is de f ined as the amount of income we wo uld need to give to or take from an individual , if an economic chang e did not happen , to make him as we l l off as if it did .
A rea sonable measure to adopt is the money metric utility function (i.e., the expenditure function) . for a welfare l o ss, bo t h a r e negati ve . Alth o ugh the CV seems rea sonable f o r some compensati o n scheme at the new prices, the EV is better fo r measuring the "willing ness to pay" (?.'1 ; p . 265). There are two reasons f o r this . First , the EV measures the income change at current prices and it is much easier for decision makers to judge the value o f a dollar at current prices than at some hypothetical prices. Second , if we are comparing more than one proposed policy change , t he CV keeps changing the b ase prices while the EV keeps the bas e prices fixed at the old p rices. Thus , the EV is mor e suitable for compa r is o ns among v ari ous tax programs .
For measuring the welfare change fur the economy as a whole , the welfare co sts of the tax bei ng considered a re measured by aggregating the cvs or EVs acr oss the individuals .
The sum of EVs is a more e asily interpreted measure because old incomes and prices are used and a re t ypical l y the same i n the sequence of pairwise co mparis o ns [9 ] . This is also supported b y the second re aso n o f the superi o rit y of the EV t o the CV.
In calculating the cvs and EVs in practice, t h e expenditure function is obtain ed as below by i nve rti ng the indirect utility functi o n , which is de rive d by substituting (14), (15) , and (16) into (9) o n the page 16 -l B:
Ij = Vj (aljPll-sj + a 2 jP 2l-sj + a3jPwl -sj) 1/(1 -sj) Therefore , the CV and EV in (22) and ( 23) h : values at the tax prog r ams 1 , 2 , and 3 . Table fl shows the values of the cvs and EVs comparing the no -tax equilib ri um price with each of equilibrium prices of three tax programs . As seen from the Table ~, at the tax program 1 , the rich become wo r s e o f f and th e m i d d 1 e and po o r be t t e r o f f , 1 ea v i n g the economy "as a whole" worse off . At new prices due to the 50% tax on capital in come in sector 1 , we must give the rich 1. 827 more units of income at new incomes to compensate them for a price change such that ut ility is unchanged , while the middle and poor are willing to pay 0 . 0J21 and l . 5R3 units of income from the new incomes fo r the pre -tax satisfaction .
These income changes would be necessary to co mp ensate the consumers f o r the price change. Meanwhile, at old prices (i.e . , at no-tax equilibrium prices) , the old income minus 1.855 units is needed to r each the new utility for the rich while 0.021 (and 1. 524) more units of income at the o ld incomes wi 11 make the middle (and the poor) reach the new utility in t his tax system. These income changes at the new prices wo uld be equivalent to the proposed change .
At the tax program 2 , comparing no -tax equilibrium to equilibrium with 50% tax on capital income in both sectors , the economy as a whole does not expe r ience any welfare change because the tax is non -distortiona ry, even though the ri ch become worse off and the middle and poor better off . At new prices due to the taxes , we must give the rich 2.18~ units of income at current incomes to co mpensate f o r a price change such that utility is unchanged , while the middle and poo r are willing to pay 0 . 335 and 1.845 units of income from the current incomes to achieve no-tax utility. Meanwhile , at old prices (i.e . , at no-tax equilib r ium prices) , the old income minus 2. 177 units is needed to reach the new utility for the ri ch while ~. 334 (and 1.843) more units of income at the old incomes wi 11 make the middle (and the poo r) reach the new utility.
At the tax program 3 , 50 % t ax on la bor and capital income in both sectors , the economy as a whole becomes worse off even tho ugh the poor improve their welfare and the ri ch and middle become worse off. At new prices due to the taxes , we must give the rich and middle 2 .~74 and 0 . 114 units of income at current incomes and we can take ~.781 units of income away from the old income of the poor to compensate f o r a price change such that utility is unchanged .
Meanwhile , at old prices (i.e ., at no-tax equilibrium prices), the old incomes of the rich and middle minus 2.347 and 0 . 099 units is require d to reach the new utility for them, while ~-~59 more units of income at the old incomes will make the middle reach the new utility .
What must be emphasized once again is that the EV measures the income change at current prices, so we can judge the value of a dollar at curre nt p ri ces and the EV uses the With the same parameter values as the n o -tax model , the solution to this tax model is c haracterized by 22 variables , the four prices , Pl , P 2 , Pw , and Pk , nine demand quantities , Xll , X21 , Rl , Xl2 , X22 , R2 , Xl3 , X23 , and R3, two labor and capital inputs , Ll, L2 , Kl , and K~, two capital intensities ,
